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jectured without comparison with the original, appears to be almost always well and carefully done. There are slips here and there which it does not need comparison to detect, but the only thing one cares to mention is the use, irritating because it recurs so incessantly, of "to" instead of "for" after the verb "substitute," *e. g.*, "substitute the relative *to* the absolute point of view. Mr. Harrison's Introduction [or Note, as it is afterwards more appropriately called] is, he explains, a notice of the book, written on the appearance of the French original and now reprinted nearly as written.

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THE CRITICS OF HERBARTIANISM AND OTHER MATTERS CONTRIBUTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE HERBARTIAN QUESTION. By F. H. Hayward, D. Lit., M. A., B. Sc. (Lond.), B. A. (Cantab), assisted by M. E. Thomas, Battersea Polytechnic. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1903.

HERBART AND THE HERBARTIAN THEORY OF EDUCATION, A CRITICISM. By Alexander Darroch, M. A. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903.

There is a certain amount of similarity in the contents of these two volumes, but they differ essentially in purpose and in method of treatment. Dr. Hayward writes as a professed and enthusiastic Herbartian, and in reproducing the criticisms of others he does so with the object of showing that "as the system is grounded upon many a deep moral and psychological truth, though its outworks may fall to ruin, its main walls will surely stand" (p. 17). Professor Darroch, on the contrary, is a firm opponent of the doctrines he regards as fundamental to Herbartianism, and he writes with a conviction which derives its strength from a definite philosophical position of his own—a position which it is the positive aim of his book to enforce and recommend. Equally marked with this difference in aim is a difference in method of treatment. Professor Darroch gives us a continuous and sustained argument, Dr. Hayward a series of disconnected, and not entirely consistent, summaries. Fourteen sets of criticisms are summarized, and the one principle of arrangement is that of authors' names. It seems to us that a systematic treatment under topics would have been more helpful to the reader.

Dr. Hayward precedes these summaries by an Introduction of some thirty-five pages, a Historical Survey of about forty pages, and an account of Herbartian Literature in English of some eleven pages. In the introduction we have some enthusiastic advocacy of Herbartianism, but no definite setting forth of the doctrines against which the criticisms reproduced in Part IV are directed, still less any systematic attempt to justify them. "To the writer, the system founded by Herbart is a moral gospel for men perishing through stupidity and absence of ideas" (p. 6). "Extinguish Herbartianism and you extinguish for a century the hopes of Education" (p. vi). It is true that "to claim Herbartianism as a remedy for all the evils which afflict mankind would be veritable folly" (p. 13), but evidently Dr. Hayward believes they will never be cured without Herbartianism.

When such large claims are made we are justified in asking what exactly is meant by Herbartianism. And this is not very easy to answer from Dr. Hayward. As Professor Darroch points out, there are two main divisions in the Herbartian camp—those who accept Herbart's philosophical position and regard his ethics and psychology as the bases of the pedagogical system, and those "who prefer to follow the spirit of their master rather than *definitely* pin their faith to his doctrines with their metaphysical and psychological foundations" (pp. 4, 5). In spite of the passage quoted above, Dr. Hayward belongs to the latter of these classes. But it is not apparent how far he rejects Herbart's doctrines, or what he would substitute in their place. Thus in one place we read, "Herbartianism, with all its faults, is a *system*, apparently the only educational system in existence which has at the same time a definite psychology, a vast and fairly coherent mass of literature . . . above all, the power of raising enthusiasm" (p. 52). And on p. 39, in an "Outline of Herbart's Doctrines," we are told that "teachers must know psychology. . . . But *which* psychology? Herbart's." Yet on p. 31 "be it remembered, the Herbartian principles of education were, after all, never *deduced* from the doctrine of the presentation-mechanism. Critics who forget this merely tilt at windmills." And on p. 209 Professor Darroch's criticism is said to be marked by "persistent irrelevancy," because he regards the psychology as "the foundation of the pedagogy." This charge Dr. Hayward thinks is established by pointing out that "Herbart's psychology was elaborated years

after his chief educational works were written" (p. 209). It is of course true that, with the important exception of the "Lectures on Pedagogy," Herbart published his educational writings before his books on psychology. But surely it will not be urged that Herbart had no general psychological position before he published works on the subject. It may be true, as Dr. Hayward quotes from Professor James, that "the pedagogics and the psychology ran side by side, and the former was not derived in any sense from the latter" (p. 209). But is it not equally true that, as Professor James goes on to say, "everywhere the teaching must *agree* with the psychology"? And if the psychology is not an integral part of Herbartianism, what is meant by saying that "the Herbartians are . . . fully alive to the dangers of their presentational psychology" (p. 21)? Dr. Hayward's position seems to be that "Herbart's psychology may be incorrectly based, yet for the teacher it may be the best psychology in existence" (p. 31), for "the educator must, in large measure, view his pupil as a presentation-mechanism and nothing else" (p. 28). This seems to us to mean that a teacher will do better work if he holds a false view of child nature—or even pretends to hold it, knowing it to be false—than if he holds a true view. If it does not mean this, we are at a loss to see what it does mean. In short, we cannot grant that the psychology is a detachable adjunct to Herbartianism. As Professor Darroch says, "It needs to be emphasised at the present day that educational practice is explicitly, but more often implicitly, based on educational theory, and that every educational theory is founded not merely on a psychology of mental development, but on some philosophical theory as to the meaning and value of human life" (pp. vi, vii). This indeed is the teaching of Herbart himself, for he says in the *Lectures*, "Education as a science is based on practical philosophy and psychology" (*Felkin's Trans.*, p. 102). To suppose with Dr. Hayward that "the student can, if he choose, supply the supposed deficiencies of Herbartianism by adding correlative spiritual factors . . . and he can, with a clear conscience, call himself a reformed Herbartian" (p. 33) seems to us to show either confusion of thought or a remarkable disregard of the necessity for consistency. Between the conceptions of the mental life as teleological and as built up from the outside by presentations there is, as Vogel shows, a definite opposition (*Hayward*, p. 140), and the only sense in which the one conception can be added on to the other is when

presentationism is degraded from the position it claims in Herbart and is given the lower place of a metaphorical description of one aspect of mental life, and that not the most important aspect. Unless "Herbartian" is to connote some definite view of the nature of life, we cannot see what is gained by using the term to designate a school of educational thought and practice. That much in Herbartian practice is good and suggestive no competent observer would deny. That Herbartians do well in insisting on the value of interest and systematic knowledge may be granted, with the reservation that "interest" is not used in a sense which accords with Herbart's psychology, and that knowledge is not the sole, or even the chief, deciding factor in conduct. But to say that all who hold such doctrines as these are Herbartians seems to us to be playing with terms. Yet this is what Dr. Hayward apparently claims on p. 53 of his "Student's Herbart." That the German critics of Herbartianism have regarded the pedagogy as essentially connected with the ethics and the psychology is abundantly evident from Dr. Hayward's summary of their objections. At any rate, when Herbartianism is offered us as a "gospel," it would be well to explain definitely and explicitly what view of life it sets forth. If it is the practical identification of knowledge with virtue and the derivation of feeling and will from the "circle of thought," then the essence of the Herbartian psychology is implicitly there; if it is not this, we ask what is to replace it. And to this question we can find no answer in Dr. Hayward.

We have confined our remarks to this one question because it seems to us to be the one essential point at issue between the Herbartians and their opponents. It follows that we do not agree with Dr. Hayward in thinking Professor Darroch's line of criticism "irrelevant." Nor does it seem to us that the charge of plagiarism is proved by a series of such points of resemblance as are shown to exist between Professor Darroch's book and "The Student's Herbart." Anyhow, we find nothing in the latter book corresponding to the sustained and incisive criticism Professor Darroch gives us. In Dr. Hayward's opinion, "Mr. Darroch has nothing fresh, original, or stimulating to present to the teachers of Britain" (p. 213). We can only say that we do not agree with Dr. Hayward. Professor Darroch's criticisms are not "fresh" in the sense of never having been made before, but then neither are many of those Dr. Hayward summarises for us. But they are

urged clearly and incisively, and above all they are set forth in the light of a very positive theory—that human life is purposive and that its unity is fundamentally a unity of purpose, not of presentations. This we hold to be stimulating doctrine for the teachers of Britain, or any others who care for the meaning of life.

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SOME ETHICAL PHASES OF THE LABOR QUESTION. By Hon. Carroll D. Wright. Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1903, pp. 207.

Under the above title, Mr. Wright discusses "Religion in Relation to Sociology," "The Relation of Political Economy to the Labor Question," "The Factory as an Element in Civilization," and "The Ethics of Prison Labor." In the treatment of these questions there is evinced a high ethical ideal, a rational and well-balanced sympathy with the laboring class, and a strong conviction that the labor problem will never be solved until ethical principles dominate alike the employers and the employed. Mr. Wright forcibly maintains that in all dealings of man with man the ethical factor is of prime importance; that, therefore, in dealing with sociological problems, and so also in economics—a branch of sociology—the ethical aspect of the question in hand must ever be brought to the front. Indeed, no truth is more important to the student of social and economic problems, to the practical business man, and to the laborer and labor organizations, than that *all* relations between man and man are fundamentally relations between spiritual, and thereby ethical, beings. As such each man should be treated as an end in himself and not as a mere means or commodity. Until this view is taken a permanent solution of sociological problems must remain an unrealized dream.

In discussing the relation between religion and sociology the sphere of each is kept quite distinct, while at the same time they are recognized to be correlated forces acting upon human life and destiny (p. 7). Both are considered to be concerned with the ideal of life, which is taken to be the greatest happiness of all—a principle, by the way, which can be accepted as an ethical ideal only with important qualifications. But not only are religion and sociology correlated, though distinct, they are also inseparable. For while sociology gives us a scientific study of facts, it is the province of religion to act as a guiding norm to the conduct in